America's nuclear power plants are more incontinent than a
nonagenarian with an enlarged prostate.

Given the nuclear industry's long record of leaks, fires, rust-outs,
and lax oversight, a catastrophic failure at one of America's
nuclear power plants is a real possibility. If one happened, the oil-
devastated gulf would look like an organic garden compared to
the millennia-long radiological devastation from a major nuclear
accident.

Pipes at 27 of America's 65 nuclear power sites have sprung
leaks that released corrosive and radioactive materials including
tritium, cesium and strontium-90 into the air, water, or earth. At
New York's Indian Point, which sits within 50 miles of 8 percent
of the U.S. population, some 2 million gallons of corrosive water
have leaked into the plant's containment building over 17 years.
In compliance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
regulations, there were no visual inspections of the leaky system
from 1973 when the plant was built until 2009 when the situation
became critical. 

Cracks found in 2009 in the Davis-Besse reactor, near Toledo,
could have let radioactive coolant into the reactor's containment
building. In 2002, similar fissures allowed water and acid to
erode parts of the containment lid from a thickness of  8 inches to
barely a quarter inch. "The plant was about a month from
meltdown," says Arnie Gundersen, who worked for 22 years in
the nuclear industry as a senior vice president.
 
As with any mechanical system, from your car to the space
shuttle, small failures can indicate sloppy engineering, poor
maintenance, weakened components, and the likelihood of fatal
breakdowns.

Widespread leaks and cracks in America's nukes, many near
their 40-year life expectancy, are urgent warning signs of
dangerous deterioration. Nonetheless, the NRC, has
grandfathered in lower standards and rubberstamped all 59
applications it received for extending the operating life of
reactors for another 20 years, and is considering, or expected to
consider, 37 more renewals in the next seven years.

This spring, the only state with the legal authority to sidestep the
NRC and refuse relicensing, voted to do just that. Vermont
legislators had grumbled about safety at the 38-year-old Vermont
Yankee facility after a fire damaged the plant in 2004 and a
cooling tower partially collapsed in 2007. It was not just the
injury to the environment or the threat to safety that spurred the
vote to shut the plant when its license expires in 2012, but the
added insult that the plant owner, Entergy, had repeatedly lied to
the legislature. Underground pipes had been spilling radioactive
material  into the environment since 2007, but the New-Orleans
based company insisted not only that the underground pipes
didn't leak, but that they didn’t even exist.

 "After decades underground, neither the NRC nor the plant
operators can be absolutely certain that the pipes are intact," said
Edward J. Markey (D-MA), chairman of the House Energy and
Environment Subcommittee. “I am appalled by the safety
procedures not only at Vermont Yankee, but at other nuclear
facilities across the country who have failed to inspect thousands
of miles of buried pipes at their facilities.’’

This regulatory failure has lessons for the oil and gas sector.
Until 1976 one federal agency both promoted the atomic industry
and regulated its safety. Recognizing the inherent conflict of
interest, the functions were separated, and the NRC was tasked
with protecting the public. 

 In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the Obama
administration ordered a similar severing of Minerals and Mining
Service's promotion and protection functions.  But the example of
the NRC shows that the problem lies deeper. Revolving doors
and political appointments, the corrosive influence of industry
lobbying and campaign contributions and the lack of a
comprehensive energy policy have ensured that the NRC remain
in thrall to industry. All but three NRC commissioners took
industry jobs on leaving the agency, says Gundersen, of
Fairewinds Associates, an independent research organization.

On the bright side, nuclear plants do have better back ups than
oil rigs. But that very redundancy has fed the smug
industry/NRC argument that the ability of plants to operate after
accidents proves they are safe.

In his State of the Union address, Obama endorsed a new
generation of nuclear power. A few months later he embraced
deepwater drilling, and we know how that turned out.
 
America's aging plants "are rusting out," says Gundersen, "and
the NRC is not enforcing laws on book and is looking the other
way."

Asked if he thought a major nuclear accident was inevitable,
Gunderson paused. "Sooner or later," he said," in any foolproof
system the fools are going to exceed the proofs."